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Abstract
Research into solar geoengineering, far from being societally neutral, is already
highly intertwined with its emerging politics. This review outlines ways in
which research conditions or constructs solar geoengineering in diverse ways,
including the forms of possible material technologies of solar geoengineering;
the criteria and targets for their assessment; the scenarios in which they might
be deployed; the publics which may support or oppose them; their political
implications for other climate responses, and the international relations, gover-
nance mechanisms, and configurations of power that are presumed in order to
regulate them. The review also examines proposals for governance of research,
including suggested frameworks, principles, procedures, and institutions. It
critically assesses these proposals, revealing their limitations given the context
of the conditioning effects of current research. The review particularly high-
lights problems of the reproduction of Northern norms, instrumental
approaches to public engagement, a weak embrace of precaution, and a persis-
tent—but questionable—separation of research from deployment. It details
complexities inherent in effective research governance which contribute to
making the pursuit of solar geoengineering risky, controversial, and ethically
contentious. In conclusion, it suggests a case for an explicit, reflexive research
governance regime developed with international participation. It suggests that
such a regime should encompass modeling and social science, as well as field
experimentation, and must address not only technical and environmental, but
also the emergent social and political, implications of research.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The politics of climate change has gained urgency in recent years, with climate emergencies declared, and net-zero tar-
gets announced by many countries, cities, and companies (Climate Emergency Declaration, 2020; Williams, 2019). This
has brought proposals for large-scale carbon removal (carbon geoengineering) center stage, but research into related
proposals to ameliorate global warming by reducing incoming solar radiation (solar geoengineering), although less
prominent, has also grown substantially since Paul Crutzen's call for its consideration in 2006 (Crutzen, 2006). Solar
geoengineering at a global scale carries high stakes: it may be rapid but has deep implications for climate policy, justice,
security, and international relations and is controversial with publics. Yet solar geoengineering can be expected to gain
more prominence as temperatures continue to rise. It is therefore timely to review both how solar geoengineering
research may be influencing climate politics, and how such research might be appropriately governed. In this respect
we hope to complement recent review work that has focused on other aspects of solar geoengineering such as ethics,
law, economics and social science (Flegal et al., 2019), the governance of deployment (Reynolds, 2019a), or the role of
responsible research and innovation (RRI) in geoengineering of all types (Low & Buck, 2020).
Interest in governance for geoengineering—both regarding deployment and research—also grew rapidly in the late
2000s. By 2011, calls for research governance had been made from both within and outside of the geoengineering
research community—including from science institutions (Royal Society, 2009), climate scientists (Asilomar Scientific
Organizing Committee [ASOC], 2010), politicians in the United Kingdom and United States (House of Commons Sci-
ence and Technology Committee, 2010; US Government Accountability Office, 2010), influential think-tanks (Long
et al., 2012), and new dedicated groups (Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, 2011). Contemporaneously
parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity called for a moratorium on geoengineering activities that might affect
biodiversity, with the exception of small-scale research in controlled settings. And the London Protocol adopted a
framework on ocean fertilization (Ginzky & Frost, 2014) providing for assessment of both whether a proposed activity
has genuine scientific attributes and of its potential environmental impacts.
Research governance proposals (reviewed in Section 3) range from light-touch self-regulation by scientists to strong
international frameworks to constrain or enable such research. The mechanisms suggested include: codes of ethical
and legal principles; the application of frameworks such as anticipatory governance, responsible innovation, and mis-
sion driven research; novel institutions and formal procedures involving moratoria, thresholds, transparency registers,
and public consent. However, currently there is no widely recognized code, standard, or institution governing solar geo-
engineering research. Rather, there remains a palimpsest of different ideas, patchily applied in desk and laboratory
research (with few field experiments attempted, but increasing amounts of public and stakeholder engagement). In the
absence of consistent governance, research is conditioning and constructing particular social and technical manifesta-
tions of solar geoengineering in ways that may inappropriately prejudice1 the politics of future global climate action.
The ways in which ongoing research may affect the emerging politics of solar geoengineering extend far beyond the
direct contribution of research findings to rational debate and policy-making. In Section 2 we summarize key aspects of
the politics of research, including work indicating that research activities can condition or construct the material tech-
nologies that may emerge, the criteria and targets against which they might be assessed, the scenarios in which their
deployment might be considered, the publics which may support or oppose them, the political implications they might
have for other climate responses or for international relations, and the international relations, governance mechanisms,
and configurations of power that are presumed in order to regulate them. If we consider potential deployment of solar
geoengineering to merit governance in the public interest (Reynolds, 2019b), then all these effects make governance of
research equally important. And by “research” we do not mean only natural science, experimentation, and engineering
(the focus of most research governance proposals), but also modeling, public engagement, ethics, and critical social and
political science. Like Low and Schäfer (2019), we understand research that constructs “futures” as necessarily political,
and capable of structuring expectations and foreclosing alternatives.
The paper then proceeds by critically reviewing proposals for governance for solar geoengineering research
(Section 3) revealing their limitations in the face of the conditioning effects of current solar geoengineering research,
and developing a novel critique of research governance proposals on that basis. In selecting material we defined “gover-
nance” broadly as the intentional exercise of power to influence other actors to behave in ways reflecting some concep-
tion of a wider public interest, while noting that in the absence of effective international governance, “de-facto
governance” (Gupta & Möller, 2019) may be constituted through existing power relations. In Section 4 we briefly con-
sider some examples of research governance in practice for solar geoengineering experiments. In Section 5 we seek to
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synthesize learning from the review, highlighting shortcomings in the extant proposals. Finally in Section 6 we draw
conclusions and make suggestions for future research governance.2
2 | HOW RESEARCH CONDITIONS POLITICS AND PRACTICE
In response to a threat such as climate change, most research is seen as inherently “policy-relevant,” generating knowl-
edge that can better inform those making decisions and designing tools to mitigate the threat or its impacts. Practicing
researchers often understand policy relevance in terms of a linear or “technocratic” model (Hulme, 2009, p. 102) of
science-policy interaction. In this idealized model, policy-makers are rational actors, responding (however imperfectly)
to the public interest, informed by objective evaluations of problems and possible responses. Scientific research is inde-
pendent and objective, enabling better policy-making.
However, for climate science in general, and solar geoengineering research in particular, the situation is rather more
complicated. We need not rehearse the extent to which climate science is contested, politicized, and “post-normal”
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Hulme, 2009). Nor the deep complications and injustices introduced by histories of colonial
and post-colonial (resource) exploitation (Ghosh, 2016; Mitchell, 2011; Moore, 2015), and by the ongoing social contes-
tation of climate policy through continued disinformation by vested interests (Oreskes & Conway, 2011). Yet solar geo-
engineering is further complicated by being primarily a “technological imaginary” (Jasanoff, 2015), which is produced
through research, regulation, and opinion (Stilgoe, 2015) and which in turn co-produces (future) societies and interna-
tional orders.
Almost all scholars writing about geoengineering appear to support some form of research governance, although
the extent recommended is highly variable. Many acknowledge, for instance, that geoengineering research may touch
on “sensitive questions of sovereignty … inter-generational rights and responsibilities … [and] tensions between the pri-
vate and public sector” (Carlarne, 2011). Others highlight issues such as distrust in experts and researchers and their
motives, lack of control over the symbolic significance of research, and systemic concerns such as lock-in, moral hazard,
and even military conflict (Lin, 2016). We argue here that effective and extensive research governance is essential:
rather than simply informing policy, geoengineering research is already conditioning and potentially prejudicing future
climate politics.
We draw on relevant debates and literature spanning climate science, environmental humanities, politics, science
and technology studies, ethics and international relations to identify four major—and interconnected—ways in which
solar geoengineering research might prejudice climate politics. In each we suggest that decisions over how research is
conceived, funded and performed are excluding, promoting, or locking in outcomes more properly considered the terri-
tory of democratic and/or intergovernmental debate and negotiation. We consider politically performative and not only
constative effects of research; that is, rather than simply producing true (or false) statements on solar geoengineering,
research—as “speech acts” (Austin, 1959; Searle, 1969), or as part of the co-production of science, technology, and soci-
ety (Jasanoff, 2015)—inevitably also “does things” in the world. First, research performatively imagines and in a very
real sense enables the construction of particular configurations of material technologies. Second, research helps evoke
and assemble epistemic communities, stakeholder groupings and even publics with particular orientations towards the
topic. Third, research helps construct de facto forms of governance, normalizing and institutionalizing research, adding
to climate pathways in which the deployment of solar geoengineering appears desirable or even inevitable. Fourth,
research implies or creates capacities and expectations that condition international relations in the climate sphere.
These four routes are not unique to geoengineering among novel high-risk technologies, but in combination raise
potent risks.
2.1 | Technological imaginaries
The dominant mode of solar geoengineering research uses Earth system models to project the effects of particular inter-
ventions (Irvine et al., 2016), but in doing so, modelers imagine particular technical constructions and possibilities most
of which do not (yet) exist in the material world. The commonly modeled imaginaries of SRM changed from those of
“turning down the sun” with space mirrors to distributed veils of stratospheric particulates, not because the former was
seen as technologically infeasible, but because modeling the latter became practical as modeling capabilities developed
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(Stilgoe, 2015). Carefully targeted and modulated stratospheric deployments are still widely modeled while effectively
presuming their technological (and political) feasibility (McLaren, 2018).
In models, these technical imaginaries have not only particular defined parameters, but also presumed purposes
and political forms (Bellamy, 2016; Lin, 2016; Szerszynski et al., 2013). These presumed purposes (typically climate risk
reduction via global optimization of SRM through intergovernmental agreement) may be equally infeasible. Yet they
reflect the ways research anticipates or establishes criteria, concepts, and scenarios for the assessment of geoengineering
(Bellamy, 2016; Bellamy & Palmer, 2019; Flegal & Gupta, 2018; McLaren, 2018; Sugiyama et al., 2018; Talberg
et al., 2018; Wiertz, 2015). For instance, to run models to obtain clear results tends to imply a presumption of global
planning (Corry, 2017); or to assess the relative desirability of different outcomes, modelers need to assume that all peo-
ple have the same climatic interests, rather than ones which vary nationally, or even between groups or localities
(McLaren, 2018; Wiertz, 2015). Moreover, the scenarios evaluated are typically based on those included in the Geo-
engineering Model Intercomparison Project (Kravitz et al., 2011), which are designed primarily for modeling conve-
nience rather than as a reflection of reality (Sugiyama et al., 2018).
These processes can be self-reinforcing. Stratospheric aerosol injection in part became “locked-in” as the most
widely modeled form of solar geoengineering and the presumptive technological configuration because of a combina-
tion of simple assumptions and a growing body of work, despite performing badly when experts and stakeholders were
enabled to set and weight criteria in a multi-criteria assessment (Bellamy et al., 2013). This effect has subsequently been
reinforced by growing interest in fast-acting responses to climate impacts and developing technical understanding of
the options for solar geoengineering (MacMartin et al., 2018).
The snowball effect of such research prioritization applies also to critical social and political science, and research
questioning the ethics of geoengineering. Following Nordmann (2007) and Rip (2012), Science and Technology Studies
scholars (Flegal, 2018; Stilgoe, 2015) have highlighted that analysis of the ethics of particular socio-technical formations
of geoengineering could help solidify and establish those imaginaries, increasing their salience, and increasing the like-
lihood that they might be further examined scientifically, or even grasped at politically, in the face of an apparent “cli-
mate emergency.” As Flegal et al. (2019) suggest, social science more generally, including engagement studies, might be
as complicit in “naturalizing geoengineering” as natural science research, prematurely stabilizing it as a policy option.
2.2 | Publics and communities
Unevenly empowered epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) of networked researchers and experts play important roles
in defining problems and developing responses. Dominant ones also establish and spread norms and presumptions
regarding research topics and practices. The geoengineering epistemic community has been notoriously narrow
(Kintisch, 2010) and despite growth in numbers in the last decade remains predominantly white, male, wealthy, and
Northern—even in contrast with broader climate change networks (Biermann & Möller, 2019; Buck et al., 2014;
Stephens & Surprise, 2020). Deliberate efforts to broaden the community include the Solar Radiation Management Gov-
ernance Initiative (SRMGI) (2011), which has actively sought to engage scientific and policy audiences in the global
South, and in recent years has provided funding in the DECIMALS program for SRM modeling research based in the
global South.3 Unfortunately while the topics of investigation have been defined by Southern partners, the models,
norms, and practices applied in DECIMALS remain primarily those of the dominant Northern research community.
For Victor (2008, p. 325), such a process is part of a desirable governance effort to spread scientific norms through
international collaboration, and to enable research by “socializing” scientists even in countries skeptical about
geoengineering research.
Research into technological imaginaries not only helps construct the epistemic communities, it also assembles par-
ticular publics, including through engagement seeking to assess public opinion (Bellamy & Lezaun, 2017; Chilvers &
Kearnes, 2019). In introducing the technologies to its subjects, such research also inevitably frames them. Such publics
may be supportive, but research may also fuel geoengineering conspiracy thinking (Cairns, 2016). Similarly, stakeholder
engagement exercises by researchers can serve to create stakeholder interests as much as they identify pre-existing ones
(Turnhout et al., 2010), contributing to a process whereby policy-making regarding such novel issues reconfigures the
polity (Hajer, 2003). Such stakeholder exercises have been undertaken primarily in the global North, indicating condi-
tional support for more research (Asayama et al., 2017; Burns et al., 2016; Flegal et al., 2019). Those directly engaging
global Southern interests suggest more desperate concern about climate impacts, and in some studies, more—although
still cautious—openness to geoengineering (Carr & Yung, 2018; Sugiyama et al., 2020) but in others deep reluctance to
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engage with geoengineering outside of the context of colonial and imperial legacies (Flegal et al., 2019; McLaren &
Corry, 2021). Such findings suggest a critical need for future geoengineering research to be better rooted in Southern
theory and epistemology, rather than predominantly reflecting Northern research norms.
By contrast, for some researchers, geoengineering is an aspect of an “ecomodernist” ideology, which posits that past
environmentalism has failed, and that new approaches, more positive towards technologies such as nuclear power and
geoengineering are desirable. Ecomodernists (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015; Grinspoon, 2016) tend to actively seek to build
public support for such interventions, whereas some prominent geoengineering researchers echo similar themes
(Keith, 2013). Such a framing of geoengineering both reflects and shapes research agendas. Critics of the ecomodernist
approach point to the convenient coincidence between the solutions it advocates, and sustained growth in consump-
tion, avoiding redistributive economics, or lifestyle change (Gardiner, 2011). Although publics show grave concern
about the role of financial interests in geoengineering (and geoengineering research) (Bellamy et al., 2017; McLaren
et al., 2016), they may respond to the ecomodernist framing. Hence, along with interest groups and media, research
helps to create publics.
2.3 | De facto governance
Geoengineering research also helps to construct de facto forms of governance. In particular, high-level “authoritative
assessments” undertaken by panels of elite scientists construct geoengineering as an object of governance by demarcat-
ing and categorizing the field (Gupta & Möller, 2019). Such assessments also normalize and institutionalize geo-
engineering research (and specific epistemic communities). Such emergent, de facto sources of governance “are
unacknowledged and unrecognized as seeking to govern, even as they exercise governance effects” (Gupta &
Möller, 2019, p. 48) both directly steering research and indirectly establishing patterns and expectations for subsequent
formal governance.
For example, IPCC assessments (Beck & Mahony, 2018; Gupta & Möller, 2019) legitimize model-based findings
(regardless of the limitations of such methods), which in turn establish particular pathways. Previously these have
included, for example, pathways heavily reliant on forms of carbon geoengineering (Carton et al., 2020; Fuss
et al., 2014). Now, research sector incentives (such as publication and funding), and political encouragement to empha-
size findings commensurate with the political targets that inform IPCC report cycles, combine to prompt researchers to
construct climate scenarios and pathways in which the deployment of solar geoengineering becomes—if not
indispensible—at least desirable.
The reframing of the objectives of climate policy towards temperature suppression (McLaren & Markusson, 2020)
brings solar geoengineering firmly into the remit of the IPCC, making it the site of (permissive) de facto governance for
this technology also. These dynamics are facilitated by the relatively narrow range of political and economic variables
and presumptions that have long been embedded in the overarching baseline scenarios used by the IPCC. With limited
room in those scenarios for radical political and economic change, options for climate policy are artificially narrowed
towards tools that allow for a slower decline in emissions (currently dominated by carbon removal promises, but poten-
tially also including solar geoengineering). While the latest incarnation of IPCC scenarios, the shared socioeconomic
pathways (SSPs), involve welcome efforts to broaden the range of possible futures considered, they do not escape from
this dynamic. In the current political context the SSPs may be used as frameworks by modelers seeking to explore the
role of solar geoengineering within climate policy, in another emanation of de facto governance.
Enthusiasm for consideration of solar geoengineering may also be increased by the common perception that 1.5 or
2.0C targets may not be met without such tools in the face of economic inertia and the slow pace of mitigation. Yet
such assumptions can be self-reinforcing (McLaren & Markusson, 2020), and thus geoengineering research might con-
tribute to mitigation deterrence or moral hazard, discouraging accelerated effort in emissions reduction (Currie, 2018;
Lin, 2013; McLaren, 2016). Even initially tough regulation could lead to moral hazard, lapsing into self-regulation due
to regulatory capture and complacency (Wolff, 2019). More generally, worries of a “slippery slope” or “lock-in” effects
whereby investment in research would bias decisions towards deployment also remain valid (Gardiner &
Fragnière, 2018; Lin, 2016; McKinnon, 2019).
Technology assessment also risks a rebound effect through public and stakeholder engagement in which the limita-
tions and configuration of the technology structure the assessment practices themselves (Bellamy & Lezaun, 2017;
Chilvers & Kearnes, 2019). Public engagement in assessments seeks to “open up” debate about the potential technolo-
gies but can be seen as legitimating a particular form of governance. Even the open and responsive public engagement
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emphasized in “responsible research and innovation” may act as “efforts to shape ‘de-facto governance’, the informal
but forceful norms of scientific conduct” (Low & Buck, 2020, p. 8). This promises legitimation, judged against social
and ethical concerns rather than technical ones, explored through deliberation rather than modeling, but such forms of
governance remain unaccountable.
Experiments also constitute sites of public contestation, establishing parameters of de facto governance.
Stilgoe (2016) describes the potential for research to give political meaning to particular uncertainties, noting the con-
sensus in most geoengineering research to presume certain technologies, and to seek to establish their implications and
public acceptability. Stilgoe instead recommends reframing geoengineering research as a space for collective experimen-
tation with methods and approaches that facilitate its democratization.
2.4 | International relations
Finally, even without steps to deployment, research helps condition international political relations in the climate
sphere. Research which presumes a global planner (or forms of governance that aggregate or ignore diverse interests
and perspectives) either serves to down-play the stark multiplicity of the international, or renders as plausible a global
governance system capable of disciplining “rogues” or overruling recalcitrant anti-geoengineering actors. And other-
wise, solar geoengineering research typically puts forward simplified and ahistorical representations of the international
system. For example, rationalist international relations (Lloyd & Oppenheimer, 2014) including game theoretical
approaches (Heyen et al., 2019; Ricke et al., 2013; Weitzman, 2015) assume a limited set of unitary rational actors with
predetermined interests, and thus help construct simplified and partial expectations of both geopolitics and governance
(McLaren & Corry, 2021). Assumptions recognized as unrealistic in methods sections nevertheless generate findings
that are interpreted as valid or pertaining to the real world. Empirical research into international dynamics around
solar geoengineering suggests that, in practice, rival epistemologies and visions of political and technological futures,
within as well as between countries, will make multilateral governance hard to achieve (McLaren & Corry, 2021).
Solar geoengineering research also posits certain international identities (e.g., the [illegitimate] “rogue” nation or
agent vs. [legitimate] technology leaders or coalitions), with states usually considered the principal actors. Simulta-
neously “global governance” or world governmental authority features as a logical necessity alongside targeted and cali-
brated geoengineering scenarios. The specific target of such governance is often a moot point. When countries have
been named, for example in scenario exercises, India, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria have been portrayed as potential
unilateralists as well as the super-powers China and the United States (Barrett, 2014; Bodansky, 2011; Boettcher
et al., 2016; Lockyer & Symons, 2019; Victor, 2011).
When research effectively underplays the complex inequities and histories of the international, this inflates feasibil-
ity and risks reinforcing inequality in climate politics. Even indoor solar geoengineering research can exacerbate
inequalities in power relations between countries and domination cannot be prevented by measures such as self-regula-
tion, transparency, and information-sharing (Smith, 2018). Proponents of such measures—in settings which separate
research from deployment—typically overlook the potential for certain interventions to increase the capabilities of eli-
tes at the expense of others, regardless of whether geoengineering reduces collective risks in models. Smith highlights
that the moral intentions of those developing solar geoengineering capacities would be irrelevant to whether those
capacities changed power relations. Moreover, in an unequal world it is implausible that the underlying research pro-
grams would not reflect rich-world presumptions and values (McLaren, 2017). As Parson notes, “The scientific and
technical challenges of doing [geoengineering] well—developing high-benefit, low-risk interventions—are sufficiently
large that rich, scientifically advanced nations are likely to have substantial advantages in developing them” (2014,
p. 101). In this context ethics research suggests that solar geoengineering research should be targeted to help develop
geoengineering measures and configurations that might reduce global injustice (Morrow, 2019) but analysis by political
scientists raises the concern that current research is advancing an expert–elite technocratic form of climate intervention
that would further concentrate contemporary forms of political and economic power, currently vested in security and
fossil fuel interests backed by states such as Russia or Saudi Arabia (Stephens & Surprise, 2020).
Research—especially unilateral—might fuel the potential for geopolitical conflict (Lin, 2016) or trigger other risks
associated with deployment (Parson, 2014). “States might view another country's unilateral pursuit of geoengineering
research as contrary to their interests … Field tests could heighten tensions or lead to preemptive strikes” (Lin, 2016,
p. 2546). Yet unilateral research may be encouraged “by anticipation of economic benefits [from] … private intellectual
property … [and] by the polarization of early debates on [geoengineering] governance” (Parson, 2014, p. 102).
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3 | RESEARCH GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS
Having outlined ways in which research co-constructs technologies, communities, governance, and international rela-
tions, we now turn to existing proposals for research governance. The literature is diverse, with some proposals specific
to research and others arising from discussions of deployment governance. In this section we first outline the proposals,
highlighting common themes among the frameworks, principles, institutions, and procedures suggested. Subsequently
we explore some common presumptions revealed in the proposals: that research is separable from deployment; that
more knowledge will reduce uncertainty and better inform policy; and that self-regulation is desirable as a means of
enabling research.
3.1 | Frameworks
Pasztor (2017) argues that the global governance framework for climate needs to include geoengineering, and extend
from research to deployment. Nicholson et al. (2018) advocate a polycentric framework intended to simultaneously
minimize direct risks from deployment, enable and legitimize research and policy-making, and ensure that solar geo-
engineering is only considered within a portfolio of climate responses (to limit mitigation deterrence). Dilling and
Hauser (2013) suggest that a research governance framework must respond to three sets of issues: “the direct physical
risks of the research; the transparency and responsibility in decision-making for the research; and the larger societal
meanings of the research” (p. 553). Such breadth would be facilitated by inter- and trans-disciplinary research, which
could encourage reflexivity, helping reveal inappropriate presumptions and framings (Kreuter et al., 2020), deter sol-
utionism (Asayama et al., 2019), and generate more socially relevant knowledge (Sugiyama, Asayama, Kosugi,
et al., 2017).
Responsible research and innovation (RRI) promotes and is responsive to social engagement (at all stages of
research from agenda setting to evaluation), backed by transparency, precautionary anticipation, and reflection
(Stilgoe, Owen, & Macnaghten, 2013). It is widely advocated in Europe, and has been applied to some early geo-
engineering research projects. In the case of the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) pro-
ject, the responsible innovation framework imposed by funders required a stage-gate in which public engagement and
anticipatory analysis were central (MacNaghten & Owen, 2011). Low and Buck (2020) suggest that assessment proce-
dures for geoengineering research should be thoroughly embedded in RRI practices, rather than using them merely as
a supplement to more technical approaches. As one tool to help deliver responsible research Keith (2017) recommends
formal division of research groups into “red” and “blue” teams tasked respectively with developing best-case scenarios
and exploring risks.
RRI has many similarities with “anticipatory governance,” which also advocates foresight, engagement, and integra-
tion of multiple disciplinary perspectives (Foley et al., 2018; Long et al., 2012). Originating in US practice, anticipatory
governance takes a less precautionary stance than RRI, although both envisage some form of public involvement in
determining the purpose of research and innovation and emphasize the inadequacy of conventional one-way
approaches to science communication. “Mission driven research” similarly seeks to legitimize geoengineering research
by reference to a guiding public interest (MacMartin & Kravitz, 2019)—which could steer research to support justice in
deployment (Morrow, 2019)—but places less emphasis on public engagement per se as the means of understanding the
public interest. It also often ignores the implications of the co-existence of multiple societies and hence plural inter-
acting publics.
3.2 | Principles and codes
There have been many proposals for principles for research, sometimes in the form of a code of conduct. Principles are
derived from two main schools: a more instrumental approach—legitimating research as “safe, ethical and subject to
appropriate public oversight and independent evaluation” (Hanafi & Hamburg, 2018), and a broader normative
approach appraising research by its material consequences, distributional effects, and procedural concerns such as
accountability, participation, and transparency (Callies, 2018; Gardiner & Fragnière, 2018; Morrow et al., 2009).
Some researchers have drawn on pre-existing models, such as medical ethics (Morrow et al., 2009) to suggest a case
for representative consent from the global community, and research design that minimizes scale and impacts, especially
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on human rights and on the most severely affected. Like later London Convention/London Protocol measures regard-
ing marine geoengineering (Ginzky & Frost, 2014), and other scholars (Dilling & Hauser, 2013; Hogue, 2010) Morrow
et al. emphasize that experiments should be science driven (i.e., not commercially inspired, nor even intended to pro-
vide climate change relief). A similar aspiration for scientific “purity” has been shown in publics' concern over geo-
engineering research (Bellamy et al., 2017; McLaren et al., 2016).
Also resembling the London Convention provisions, a proposed code of conduct for geoengineering research based
in principles of international law (Hubert, 2017; Hubert et al., 2016; Hubert & Reichwein, 2015) suggests a moratorium
with exceptions for responsible scientific research defined using principles of harm-minimization, proportionality, prior
independent assessment and public engagement, and transparency. Unusually, this code attempts to implement a prin-
ciple of precaution, interpreting it as requiring measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimize harmful consequences of
reasonably foreseeable threats of serious or irreversible damage. However, the code would be voluntary and applicable
only to outdoors/field research (despite the authors' recognition that societal implications and responses constitute a
principal reason for governance—alongside health, safety, and environmental impacts).
Another pre-existing model, that of scientific self-regulation, has been proposed and applied to geoengineering; tak-
ing their cue from the 1975 Asilomar conference on recombinant DNA research, researchers organized an Asilomar
conference for geoengineering in 2010 (ASOC, 2010). Participants developed five principles for research governance
(implicitly separated from deployment): aims of collective benefit (public interest); defined responsibilities and mecha-
nisms for governance of large-scale research activities; open and cooperative research (transparency); independent tech-
nical assessments to inform the public and policymakers; and public participation and consultation in research
planning and oversight, assessments, and development of decision-making processes. However, Schäfer and Low (2014)
highlight an important shortcoming of the Asilomar process: while rDNA scientists successfully framed societal con-
cerns purely in terms of technical risk, geoengineering continues to raise social, political, and ethical concerns, where
scientists lack the level of public trust needed for self-regulation.
Several Asilomar recommendations echo those in the Oxford Principles proposed in 2009 (Kruger, 2018; Rayner
et al., 2013), which target geoengineering governance more generally but highlight public participation in decision-
making (generally) and public disclosure of research and open publication of results, as part of regulating geo-
engineering as a public good. The Oxford principles contradict the implicit separation of research and deployment in
the Asilomar text, but themselves are criticized by Gardiner and Fragnière (2018) as too narrow and instrumental; gov-
ernance goes “beyond the mere monitoring and control of geoengineering technologies, and is instead [a matter] of
moral and political justification” (Gardiner & Fragnière, 2018, p. 160). In their “Tollgate Principles” Gardiner and Frag-
nière argue that any approved geoengineering research should serve a global, intergenerational, and ecological public,
and be ethically defensible with reference to norms including precaution, justice, and human rights. They call for legiti-
mate representative institutions to make decisions (rather than existing researchers and research bodies) and for inde-
pendent review that extends to the objectives and methods of research, not just its impacts. They argue further that
separation of research and deployment is practically and theoretically misguided.
3.3 | Formal procedures
Proposals for procedures are diverse, but generally reflect the most commonly cited principles reviewed above.
Greater public or stakeholder engagement is almost universally advocated, and even the exceptions presume that
publics will be represented in governance processes by public bodies or governments (e.g., Parson & Keith, 2013). Some
see engagement as an ethical duty to those potentially affected (Carr et al., 2013; Rayner et al., 2013), or a means to
widen involvement, especially internationally and to indigenous cultures, and thus increase the consideration of ques-
tions of distributional justice (Carr et al., 2013; Morrow, 2019). Frumhoff and Stephens (2018) argue for a “systematic
process for meaningful international engagement” including “informed consent.” Nicholson et al. (2018) suggest a
global forum (involving publics) as part of polycentric governance of solar geoengineering. Most encourage upstream,
early public engagement in research, some explicitly calling for engagement in research design and scenarios
(McLaren, 2018; Sugiyama et al., 2018). Several note the serious challenges of recognizing fully all relevant groups and
suggest extending engagement practices to enable recognitional justice (Hourdequin, 2018; McLaren, 2020; Preston &
Carr, 2018). Public engagement is a central aspect of both RRI and anticipatory governance, reflecting expectations that
it can deliver not just greater legitimacy, but also substantively improve decisions and meet normative expectations
(Fiorino, 1990).
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Many proposals suggest forms of tiered assessment separated by thresholds relating to the potential risks or harms
arising directly from the research (Dilling & Hauser, 2013). Most distinguish modeling (harmless) from laboratory stud-
ies or outdoor experiments, either explicitly (Winickoff & Brown, 2013; Zelli et al., 2017), or implicitly, by advocating a
moratorium on deployment, with internationally defined exceptions for outdoor experiments (Bodle et al., 2014), or for
field experiments of particular scales or impact with a voluntary moratorium beyond those limits (Morgan et al., 2013;
Morgan & Ricke, 2010). Some limit the scope of the governance discussion to outdoor experiments (Parker, 2014), or
propose a boundary such that further regulation of outdoor research, experiments, or field trials is required
(e.g., Schäfer & Low, 2014). For example, the SPICE stage-gate procedure required the research team to address multi-
ple additional questions and undertake public engagement to obtain authorization—with reference to an independent
panel assessment—for an outdoor experiment (MacNaghten & Owen, 2011). The Royal Society (2009) proposed a vol-
untary international code of conduct for experiments exceeding some de minimis level. Such boundaries and thresholds
are not however consistent even as proxies for potential direct harm. To better enforce proportionality, Parson and
Keith (2013) suggest “forcing-based” thresholds related to the scale of climate impact; while Bellamy et al. (2017), draw-
ing from deliberative research, instead suggest a focus on “controllability,” which includes both technical consider-
ations of containment, uncertainty, and reversibility, and whether the research is seen to be free of malign or
commercial intensions. Many such proposals resemble environmental impact assessment procedures. These might
encourage more transparency and monitoring, but would in their present form not apply to research programs, and
possibly not to all field experiments. Furthermore, they cannot be triggered by social or ethical concerns and are
unsuited to such assessments (Craik, 2015).
Most proposals still see such procedures as enabling research, albeit with more safeguards for riskier activities. Some
scholars suggest that there should be a ban or moratorium on research beyond a particular threshold (Bodle
et al., 2014; Cicerone, 2006; Hubert, 2017; Parson & Keith, 2013), but others explicitly reject moratoria
(e.g., Carlarne, 2011; Parker, 2014). Several commentators argue that moratoria would be ineffective and limit transpar-
ency as they would incentivize researchers to “disguise the true purpose” (Lin, 2016) of their research.
Reynolds (2019b) argues additionally that moratoria would cause a form of “adverse selection” in which only the
“responsible” would comply. Morgan et al. (2013) fear that even national regulation on notification and reporting
would drive research abroad. Some suggest alternatively that research norms might include provisions for compensa-
tion in case of harms arising (Lempert & Prosnitz, 2011).
To ensure transparency, several proposals include a formal international clearinghouse or registry of research
(Craik & Moore, 2014). Openness is endorsed by many commentators (e.g., Lempert & Prosnitz, 2011; Victor, 2008).
Reynolds et al. (2018) recommend a bottom-up, primarily non-state, voluntary “research commons” for data (and pat-
ents) related to solar geoengineering, so as to facilitate information sharing and limit data fragmentation and trade
secrecy. Any such proposal would rely on a clear definition of “geoengineering research.” Most commentators seem
content with a voluntary approach here, but Winickoff and Brown (2013) suggest a national committee to advice on
demarcating geoengineering research (and also for establishing the boundary for research that needs little to no extra
oversight). Frumhoff and Stephens (2018) suggest that transparency should extend to funding sources, and that
researchers should voluntarily eschew funding from vested interests (as well as voluntarily accepting independent
oversight).
Another measure discussed as a means to protect public interests in research is patent constraints. Conventional
innovation models assume private sector involvement in making research commercially viable, and patents as the
mechanism to reward innovators. But Parthasarathy et al. (2010) document a rapid increase in patent applications with
problematic characteristics (broad patent language; concentration of patent ownership; similar patents issued by multi-
ple patent offices) and see the extant regime working against the public interest. In contrast to Reynolds et al. (2018),
they argue for a sui generis system for geoengineering based on experience with nuclear research.
3.4 | Institutions
Despite the need for institutions to implement procedures, proposals for governance institutions are less prominent in
the literature, and in many cases it appears that the procedures proposed are to be delivered through self-regulation.
Several scholars suggest institutions to screen out inappropriate experimentation. Some proposals involve anchoring
research governance in existing national or international institutions. Morrow et al. (2009) suggest institutions within
the United Nations Environmental Programme or the World Health Organisation could enforce parameters agreed
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upon by the international community, and ensure coordination of experiments. Nicholson et al. (2018) propose a near-
term polycentric and multi-level governance framework to address research as well as deployment, utilizing existing
national and international institutions. Galaz (2012) also calls for a polycentric institutional setting designed to reject
“proposals that carry considerable ecological risk”, but permit “fail-safe experimentation,” and continuous learning to
“uncover the potential” of geoengineering. All such proposals imply a form of acceptable research enabled and legiti-
mated by such institutions.
Others also see roles for new institutions in establishing principles. Winickoff and Brown (2013) propose a US
national advisory commission to establish research guidelines, with the US President's Council on Bioethics as a model
for establishing guidelines for intellectual property, financial interests, and transparency. Jinnah et al. (2018) argue that
public engagement is necessary but not sufficient for legitimate governance of outdoor research. They propose the crea-
tion of (US) state-level advisory commissions to oversee solar geoengineering research in key states. Such proposals
have the merit of specificity, but leave big question marks regarding international effect: Parson and Keith (2013) argue
that inadequate coordination of state-level governance would incentivize “shopping for lax jurisdictions.” The justice of
establishing principles at such national or regional levels is also left unaddressed, as are concerns regarding research
funding and wider challenges linked to the political economy of research.
Zelli et al. (2017) describe “hybrid multilateralism” in climate governance, with novel initiatives and institutions—
such as the Oxford Principles and the SRMGI—involving both public and private actors. SRMGI was founded by the
Royal Society, TWAS (the science academies for the developing world) and the US NGO Environmental Defence Fund
to promote scientific and policy engagement in geoengineering research across the global South. However, it structures
the dialogue in terms of the existing science, established methods and a Northern model. Similarly, Reynolds and Par-
son's (2020) suggestion that collaboration between researchers, universities, funders, academic publishers, professional
societies, and nongovernmental organizations would be adequate (and even preferable) for governance of research, if
not deployment, offers little to challenge established cultural norms or differential access to resources.
Dilling and Hauser (2013) by contrast, despite suggesting that research governance could be founded in existing
state funding review processes, and built “bottom-up” by the research community through developing norms and stan-
dards, argue that such a model would need to be supplemented with distributional concerns, and with more public par-
ticipation. Sugiyama, Asayama, Ishii, et al. (2017) suggest using a voluntary network of experts as a bridge to a more
formal institution, critically, funded by a multilateral research organization such as START or Future Earth, rather than
by a single country. Although this would still risk empowering existing scientific experts to structure governance, these
scholars also highlight an important need to develop dialogue practices in the context of local cultural traditions and
experience. Wolff (2019) argues further that institutions alone are inadequate, without a vibrant civil society holding
them, and the governance processes, accountable to the public.
4 | RESEARCH GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE
Most solar geoengineering research—modeling, laboratory studies, public engagement—so far has been conducted
under normal scientific research governance procedures, such as university ethics committees. The few examples of
experimental research highlight the limitations of such procedures. Doughty (2018) reviewed early examples, noting
that those which largely ignored social implications (a helicopter-based aerosol distribution experiment in Russia in
2009, and the Eastern Pacific Emitted Aerosol Cloud Experiment, studying cloud physics in simulated ship track emis-
sions in 2011) received little scrutiny, and that mainly after the event, and from other scientists. On the other hand, the
SPICE experiment, with its responsible innovation setting, and stage-gate governance imposed by funders, generated
public and NGO debate and commentary, and the outdoor element was cancelled. This was partly in response to revela-
tions of undisclosed patents, but also reflected the incomplete consideration of social and ethical issues highlighted by
the stage-gate panel, even though local public deliberation had been carried out (Dilling & Hauser, 2013). In reflecting
on SPICE, key participants noted that the public engagement revealed a concern with “the purposes of research that is
hard to account for in current governance. … [and] an acute awareness … that research could be a step onto a slippery
slope” (Stilgoe, Watson, & Kuo, 2013, p. 3). They conclude that distinguishing areas of research as not deserving of pub-
lic scrutiny, by using thresholds, however defined, would lack public credibility. Moreover, they acknowledge that
“Geoengineering is unavoidably entangled in a political discussion that scientists should seek to understand and engage
with” (Stilgoe, Watson, & Kuo, 2013, p. 2).
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Subsequently, Harvard's proposed Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment project (to measure side-effects
of small amounts of aerosols released from a balloon in the stratosphere) (Dykema et al., 2014) has designed a novel
oversight and scrutiny mechanism, with the experiment currently voluntarily on hold, awaiting approval from an inde-
pendent advisory committee (appointed on the initiative of the research team some five years after the experiment was
first proposed).4 In contrast, in 2020 a consortium of Australian researchers tested marine cloud brightening techniques
as a localized measure for cooling the Great Barrier Reef, under specific rules governing research within the Great
Barrier Reef Marine Park. This followed publication of the research plans, a report on the regulatory environment, and
advance public engagement exercises including with reef stakeholders and indigenous owners (Brent et al., 2020). Such
rules still fall short of robust governance for field testing, and a more consistent responsible governance framework,
including detailed risk assessment and early public consultation is recommended by McDonald et al. (2019).
5 | CRITICAL REVIEW OF THEMES IN THE PROPOSALS
Here we highlight some common shortcomings of the proposals reviewed above, in the light of the ways in which
research structures imaginaries of geoengineering in an inescapably international context. Four key issues arise: the
emergent nature of governance privileges Northern norms and leaves many stakeholders unrecognized; instrumental
approaches to public engagement leave the purpose and desirability of research unquestioned; uncertainty is seen as a
reason to enable research, rather than as a reason for precautionary governance; and the attempted separation of
research from deployment leaves the entire system vulnerable to the lock-in of risky imaginaries.
5.1 | Emergent governance and Northern norms
Victor (2008) predicts that governance will emerge “bottom up” through norms, especially in research. To inform such
governance he advocates more research and field-testing—loosely coordinated in the largely voluntary and self-
regulated model of the Human Genome Project—as a means of “socializing a community of responsible geoengineers”
(2008, p. 325). Similarly, Lempert and Prosnitz (2011) suggest the United States should actively promote strong research
norms (as long as SRM is assumed to be practical, and multilateral climate agreements feasible), whereas Morgan
et al. (2013) advocate US leadership to develop and persuade others to adopt a light-touch code for notification and
reporting on permitted low-risk experiments. More generally, across the period since 2006, frustration with slow pro-
gress on environmental issues has been accompanied by a broadening of ideas of governance, with involvement of more
diverse actors and practices (e.g., Gupta & Möller, 2019; Reynolds & Parson, 2020; Zelli et al., 2017). Scientists have
engaged primarily in controlled spaces into which civil society groups have also been invited (such as SRMGI or C2G),
and somewhat with supportive or agnostic elements in civil society, but only rarely with initiatives seeking to constrain
geoengineering research (e.g., Biofuelwatch, ETC Group, &Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2017; Muffett & Feit, 2019).
Yet most extant proposals still overlook the limitations of national or self-regulatory research governance, typically
failing to recognize the extent to which the international has inevitable and deep implications for solar geoengineering
research governance and the global commons more widely. Important regional interests in the global South are poorly
reflected in the existing research community, despite some efforts to engage academics and policy makers in such
regions (African Academy of Sciences and Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, 2013), such as through
the SRMGI's aforementioned DECIMALS fund. But the norms promoted, and the epistemic community extended,
through such mechanisms remain predominantly Northern, and the range of stakeholders is relatively narrow, leaving
many relevant interests and disciplines unrecognized. This global misalignment reflects far deeper issues than merely
access to research outcomes (Smith, 2018). The self-regulatory model of de facto governance that has emerged over the
last decade is primarily a model that reinforces existing norms and values in the Northern, elite scientific community.
5.2 | Instrumental public engagement and the purpose of research
Those keen to enable research typically present public engagement as a legitimizing tool that can help overcome social
and political obstacles. There is little in the generic advocacy of “public engagement” to shift the existing model rooted
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in science communication: publics are not recruited to shape research objectives or the scenarios modeled, but pri-
marily to “reveal” the conditions for public acceptability of the technologies (as if such public acceptability was
another objective “thing”’ to be discovered rather than co-constructed in such engagements in multiple different
societies). Such forms of engagement rarely broaden the stakeholder base or recognize those interests and publics
whose voices are currently unheard. Indeed, the publics they help construct may well largely echo the researchers'
views.
This model of engagement as science communication is strongly wedded to an ideology of disinterested science.
This encourages some scholars to posit that simply doing and communicating more research will increase trust in geo-
engineering among publics and policy makers (Lloyd & Oppenheimer, 2014; Parson, 2014). For example,
Bodansky (2013) fearing “premature rejection” of solar geoengineering, urges support for research (separate from
deployment) including regulation for the explicit instrumental purpose of creating “trust through transparency, public
participation and independent assessments.” It is true that public trust will likely be greater where such practices are
followed, but they alone do not render such research “trustworthy.”
Public engagement in research should be a two-way process, one which can question the very purpose and desirabil-
ity of the research and which can reconstruct the research community and its goals and practices as much as it might
construct a public around the topic. The SPICE governance process, considered earlier, represents a rare effort to under-
take public engagement in a way that could feed back into the project plans, through the stage-gate process (Pidgeon
et al., 2013). More generally, existing research governance and research ethics procedures designed to protect the inter-
ests of human subjects do not provide such an opportunity, and can even be unhelpful, as they constrain social scien-
tific inquiry—and deep engagement of publics—more than they limit technical experiments. Research helping us
understand the political implications of solar geoengineering research would seem at least as urgent as further technical
development or modeling (Matzner & Barben, 2020).
5.3 | Uncertainty and precaution
A common misconception that research is about reducing uncertainties (Bodansky, 2013; Currie, 2018; Parson &
Keith, 2013) arises in the assumption (again based in conventional Northern scientific norms) that solar geoengineering
is some objective technology waiting to be discovered, rather than emerging through socio-technical construction. For
such commentators, research is self-obviously desirable as a means to better inform policy-making. Policy-oriented
research demands governance (Dilling & Hauser, 2013; Low & Buck, 2020; Morrow, 2019), but the existing proposals
do not tend to acknowledge the reflexivity of the problem: that by defining and researching solar geoengineering as a
response to climate change, both the problem and the response are in turn constructed in particular ways, embodying
particular values.
From the science-communication perspective, whether research suggests that solar geoengineering would be benefi-
cial or reveals disadvantages, it is assumed that research will reduce uncertainty, rather than increasing or
redistributing it. The possibilities that precaution might be better served by political or social rather than technical
interventions, and worse still, that technological promises generated through or around research might slow climate
action (McLaren & Markusson, 2020) are rarely considered. Thus, with some exceptions (e.g., Hubert, 2017) proposals
tend to focus on ways to enable research, promote self-regulation and minimize constraints. An influential thread advo-
cates emergent, de facto governance, rather than a sui generis regime constructed with broad public and political
participation.
Some proposals further presume the desirability of including solar geoengineering in climate governance negotia-
tions. Parson (2014) suggests the risk of unilateralism is grounds to pursue “open and collaborative research” to reduce
uncertainties, especially about regional and seasonal implications of solar geoengineering, so as to enable its early inclu-
sion in international climate negotiations. A cooperative approach to geoengineering “could start immediately, with
informal consultations on research programmes, agreement on common standards for transparency, and joint develop-
ment of assessment framework” (Parson, 2014, p. 103). Lloyd and Oppenheimer (2014) also focus on avoiding unilater-
alism and look for a deployment governance regime including a scientific coordinating committee. In such proposals,
the lack of precaution extends to the presumption that comprehensive multilateral agreement would be feasible. More-
over, even if feasible, such a model would focus research on deployment in a “mission-led” mode and could be expected
to sustain Northern dominance of research.
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5.4 | Separating research from deployment
There is a persistent—arguably dominant—thread in the literature which seeks to establish or maintain a distinction
between unproblematic “research” and some more intrusive practice (deployment, or steps towards it), with a threshold
typically defined in terms of material risk. Even as Crutzen sought to stimulate more research on solar geoengineering,
Cicerone (2006) championed separate treatment of research and “engineering interventions,” positing that no special
treatment is merited for research. “We should proceed as we would on any other scientific problem, at least for theoreti-
cal and modeling studies” (2006, p. 223), he argued, suggesting that for deployment, a moratorium should be considered
with exceptions for small-scale, scientific research. Parson (2014) argues that “much of the field research to develop and
inform [geoengineering] capabilities can be carried out with small-scale interventions that are essentially riskless”
(2014, p. 92). The National Research Council (2015) advocated leaving key ethical questions to future deployment gov-
ernance, even while promoting deliberation on a framework for governance of field experiments. By contrast, RRI
frameworks tend to actively link research and deployment in the “governance of innovation” (Flegal et al., 2019), but
in practice the focus for governance has remained on the risks involved in larger scale interventions or field
experiments.
Throughout the research governance literature, the boundary between “research as normal” and “risky” research is
unclear. Many authors offer diverse perspectives on where and how to draw such a boundary: modeling versus experi-
mentation (Zelli et al., 2017), indoor versus outdoor (Parker, 2014), small scale versus large scale (MacMartin &
Kravitz, 2019; Parson & Keith, 2013), “controllable” versus “less controllable” (Bellamy et al., 2017). It is not always
explicit what extra hoops are required above the threshold, but it is typically clear that below the threshold standard
funder, national and scientific self-regulatory processes are presumed adequate.
Our understanding of the conditioning effects of research suggests this is an inappropriate presumption. Technical,
risk-based thresholds for research projects are inadequate and may even be counter-productive where the impacts are
cumulative, symbolic, political or cultural. We would argue that the crux of the problem is not the parameters or
criteria for such thresholds, nor the category boundary, but the implicit judgment that what needs governing is impacts
of the activity rather than impacts of the knowledge generated. The idea that knowledge generation is neutral and
objective is deeply rooted in scientific mythology, and it is unsurprising to see it here. But it is also long rebutted, at
least with respect to research into high-risk technologies in a setting of post-normal science (Funtowicz &
Ravetz, 1993). Indeed some governance proposals recognize this: Dilling and Hauser (2013) justify a call for broad gov-
ernance interventions on the basis that “it is what the experiment represents that matters.” Moreover scientific objectiv-
ity is deeply problematic where the objects of research are socio-technical imaginaries whose material configurations
are (in part) constructed by research. As Stilgoe (2016) argues, there is no “bright-line,” and no domain in which
research is pristine: “The reframing of the experiment as at least partly social challenges the attempt to hermetically
seal it from public scrutiny” (2016, p. 860).
Proposals rooted in assumptions of a bright-line between research and deployment—whether drawn at the labora-
tory door, or at some arbitrary threshold of scale—tend to overlook the conditioning or lock-in effects outlined above.
Nonetheless, such proposals merit further study, at least insofar as it is important to understand how they might under-
mine efforts to install appropriate and effective governance. This is not to claim that all the proponents of such limited
governance schemes support them because they would therefore enable particular formations of geoengineering socio-
technical systems. Some advocates might genuinely believe they would constitute adequate governance in liberal demo-
cratic society because they judge the risks of lock-in low or dismiss the ways in which research conditions future
trajectories.
6 | CONCLUSIONS
Most proposals for research governance reflect a shared understanding that solar geoengineering raises challenges
beyond standard research ethics and governance. But we have shown that few proposals consider the ways in which
research might construct technologies, publics, policy, and politics. Even fewer offer measures that could address preju-
dicial consequences and the slippery slope they may portend. This is a critical shortcoming: in the absence of condition-
ing effects of research, we might reasonably expect problems arising from weak research governance to be rectified by
future mechanisms for deployment governance. In the presence of such conditioning or lock-in, such mechanisms
would be too late.
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Current research governance proposals focus primarily on regulating the immediate, material impacts of research
activities, not the processes and implications of knowledge generation. They feature a questionable emphasis on defin-
ing a dividing line between activities requiring and not requiring additional governance. Distinguishing modeling from
physical interventions, lab-work from outdoor studies, or setting thresholds according to the scale or controllability of
impacts (or even a formal process to define “genuine research”) all tend to distract from underlying questions and pre-
sumptions about research and knowledge generation. Current governance proposals tend to presume that researchers
are value-free, rational and disinterested; instrumentalize (or at least silo) considerations of public engagement; ignore
existing structural inequalities in research capacities and reproduce dominant, Northern norms in research practices,
values and purposes. Put simply they abstract knowledge generation from its cultural, economic, political, and interna-
tional contexts.
In current proposals, governance is typically expected to legitimate research. It is rarely anticipated to constrain
research, or to transform its practice or purpose. The dominant framing tends towards a narrow and instrumental
rather than a capacious view of the public interest in research (defined by researchers themselves rather than by inter-
national or global publics). Emergent forms of governance extending to self-regulation are commonly accepted, at least
for forms of research categorized as low-risk.
Such governance approaches may be all that appears plausible in the current febrile political climate. But the result
risks accepting “sleep-walking” into solar geoengineering (McKinnon, 2019) through the co-evolution of research, tech-
nological imaginaries, and political responses, while attempts at international governance struggle (McLaren &
Corry, 2021). Solar geoengineering could be enlisted in further enabling (the promise of) a slow transition which pro-
tects Northern interests and the economic assets of current elites.
We conclude therefore that the patchy palimpsest of bottom-up proposals is inadequate. Instead we see a strong case
for explicit, reflexive, international research governance encompassing the emergent social, ethical, and political, as
well as technical, implications of solar geoengineering research. Unilateral action (especially in a Northern nation) to
attempt to establish a research governance regime would be undesirable, likely to replicate unhelpful epistemological
and cultural norms and reify existing power relations. There is a clear need for an international sui generis regime for
geoengineering research governance, constructed with broad international and public participation. While implausible,
a voluntary moratorium until such a regime is in place would halt “sleepwalking” while incentivizing regime-building.
The model of the London Convention/London Protocol on marine geoengineering provides useful pointers towards
firmly guiding research to the public interest and minimizing risk. Ideally a geoengineering research regime needs to
also ensure that all research recognizes and engages with its political and ethical context and is governed in a fully
international framework, implemented by national and international research funders.
We are not holding our breath for such a breakthrough, especially given the hesitancy of most civil society organiza-
tions to engage in detail with solar geoengineering.5 But in the absence or even implausibility of such a regime, even
research into solar geoengineering can be expected to reinforce and magnify the complexities which already beset
global climate politics and make the pursuit of solar geoengineering risky, controversial and ethically questionable.
While concrete proposals for a detailed research governance regime cannot be developed without international partici-
pation, here we suggest some principles and directions for such a regime.
Even though the extant research governance proposals focus on technical and natural science experiments, our
review has suggested that other research—from modeling to ethics and critical social science—can contribute to condi-
tioning or prejudicial effects, and should be encompassed by a governance regime. Nonetheless it is important to
remember that—as indicated in Section 2, certain forms of research—notably modeling, and the natural sciences—are
privileged in political institutions and processes such as the IPCC, while others, such as ethics and critical social sci-
ence, while contributing to the salience of particular techniques or configurations of geoengineering, seem to have less
political impact in terms of their content.
We would not recommend seeking to replicate a regime from some other controversial technology. This is despite
the similarity in principles outlined above, and those—inclusiveness, transparency, public engagement, and
precaution—promoted in international research collaborations on issues such as nuclear power and the human genome
(Ghosh, 2018). There is no analogue in which research is governed without being simultaneously enabled: examples
such as the human genome project involved international bodies providing funding or critical hardware as leverage to
impose rules on research (e.g., on intellectual property or liability). And for such examples it seems equally hard to sep-
arate research from subsequent deployment. Nonetheless, further studies of research governance in other controversial
technologies could help us design more practical tools and regimes for geoengineering research.
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Our analysis supports arguments that any meaningful research governance regime should include—and be based
upon—public engagement, transparency, and accountability. But most existing proposals fall short in all three respects:
presenting engagement in instrumental ways, failing to recognize many interests (especially in the global South); apply-
ing limited, and often voluntary approaches to transparency; and—with rare exceptions—shying away from consider-
ation of funding, liability, or accountability mechanisms.
Even without an overarching framework, researchers (and funding agencies) could adopt more responsible stan-
dards and approaches, particularly through early public engagement in research design and purpose. Funders could pri-
oritize improving understandings of the complexities of political and cultural constructions of solar geoengineering and
other climate policy responses. There is also a case for building on the most developed process for international engage-
ment on research, the SRMGI. So far this arguably offers inclusion without real recognition, and suffers the weaknesses
of an inbuilt separation of research and deployment. Yet it could become a platform for support to be given to research
and governance activities which engage broader Southern interests and values and thus open meaningful international
discussion and contestation over the purposes and desirability of solar geoengineering research.
At the same time support should be directed into much more trans-disciplinary, reflexive research on governance
mechanisms and their roles in technological and political co-evolution. Research processes in geoengineering should be
consistently used as sites for experimentation and contestation over governance, in processes of “collective experimen-
tation” (Stilgoe, 2016) or “learning by doing” (Parker, 2014). Lessons could be learned from more developed efforts at
meaningful engagement and co-production in other climate research areas (Klenk et al., 2015; Lemos et al., 2018).
Moreover, a reflexive assessment of “governance research” could usefully broaden our gaze to encompass equally vital
political questions of democracy, accountability, security, or justice—critical points of departure that raise different
questions about solar geoengineering research. Conceiving of the challenge in terms of governance—as a set of rules or
norms for particular forms of research—should not distract from reflections upon research as an unavoidably political
activity, nor the critical need to reconfigure its purposes as well as its practices.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank Nikolaj Kornbech for his assistance with the underlying reviews, and in editing and proofing
the manuscript. We also wish to acknowledge the constructive, and swift and invaluable feedback provided by two
anonymous reviewers. This research was funded under grant 116716 from Det Frie Forskningsråd (the Independent
Research Fund), Denmark.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Duncan Mclaren: Conceptualization; writing-original draft; writing-review & editing. Olaf Corry: Conceptualization;
funding acquisition; project administration; writing-review & editing.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT




1 Here “prejudice” refers to the unintended constitutive effects of research unduly shaping or prematurely limiting
future policy.
2 A note on our own positionalities regarding research into solar geoengineering may be helpful to the reader. As
scholars, we have conducted social, political science, and international relations research into geoengineering and
other technologies closely related to climate discourse. We both endorse the view that research into solar geo-
engineering may indeed be merited by the growing severity of the climate crisis. Yet we are increasingly concerned
that the wider body of research is—largely against the intent of its participants—becoming complicit in a process
prone to abetting climate procrastination. We have found that research plays a constitutive role in a wider process in
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which exploration of technology and governance options has effects that at a critical moment could enable continued
delay in cutting emissions. We therefore would support measures to appropriately govern all research into solar geo-




5 We note that the Climate Action Network has recently issued a statement on solar geoengineering, confirming its
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